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LEASE COVENANTS: EXCULPATION BY IMPLICATION?
R. HARVEY CHAPPELL, JR.*
THE SURRENDER CLAUSE-COVENANT OF GOOD REPAIR
At common law it was firmly established that a covenant to repair
or to leave the premises in good repair bound the tenant to rebuild the
buildings even though destroyed by fire or other accident without fault
or negligence on the part of the tenant. If he desired to relieve himself
from this liability he had to do so by excepting such liability from the
operation of his covenant.' To counter the harsh effects of the com-
mon law rule there came to appear in the typical lease language to the
effect that the leased premises would be surrendered in good condi-
tion, "reasonable wear and tear and damage by fire or other casualty
excepted." This boiler plate language persists in most leases to this date.
In many jurisdictions the common law doctrine, because it was deemed
a harsh if not unreasonable rule, has been changed by statute so as to
relieve the tenant of liability in those instances where the leased premises
are destroyed by fire or other casualty without fault or negligence on
the part of the tenant.2 Accordingly, either by the boiler plate ex-
ceptions to the tenant's covenants or by statute, it is generally held
today that the tenant is liable to the landlord only when the loss or
damage is caused by the tenant's negligence.
* Partner in the firm of Christian, Barton, Epps and Brent, Richmond, Va. Member
of the Virginia Bar, B.A. College of William & Mary (1948); B.C.L. (1950). Editor,
Insurance Counsel Journal.
1. Willis v. Wrenn, 141 Va. 385, 127 S.E. 312 (1925); Vaughan v. Mayo Milling
Company, 127 Va. 148, 102 S.E. 597 (1920); Ross v. Overton, 3 Call (7 Va.) 309 (1802).
2. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 55-226 (1950), which reads:
Buildings destroyed or lessee deprived of possession; covenant to pay rent
or repair; reduction of rent.-No covenant or promise by a lessee to pay the
rent, or that he will keep or lease the premises in good repair, shall have
the effect, if the buildings thereon be destroyed by fire or otherwise, in
whole or in part, without fault or negligence on his part, or if he be de-
prived of the possession of the premises by the public enemy, of binding
him to make such payment or repair or erect such buildings again, unless
there be other words showing it to be the intent of the parties that he
should be so bound. But in case of such destruction there shall be a reason-
able reduction of the rent for such time as may elapse until there be again
upon the premises buildings of as much value to the tenant for his purposes
as what may have been so destroyed; and, in case of such deprivation of
possession, a like reduction until possession of the premises be restored to
him.
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In recent years leases have become more sophisticated and precise in
such collateral matters as the burden of carrying insurance. It is not un-
common, for example, for the parties to agree that the landlord shall
carry insurance against loss by fire or other casualty. Also a lease
may provide for waiver of claims between landlord and tenant re-
garding losses covered by such insurance. If, in addition, a waiver
of the subrogation rights of the insurance carrier is obtained, the
tenant is in effect relieved of liability for his own negligence, and
the loss falls solely upon the insurer. However, where there are no such
waivers, the question arises as to whether the surrender clause-the
covenant to return the premises in good repair, damage by fire or other
casualty excepted-along with the stipulation that the landlord will
carry the fire insurance, can be construed to relieve the tenant of liability
for damage by fire caused by his own negligence. On this question the
authorities differ.
VIEW DENYING EXCULPATION
The older view, constituting the numerical majority, holds that the
tenant is not exculpated. It is best exemplified by Winkler v. Appala-
chian Amusement Co.3 where, in a theater lease, the tenant promised
to surrender the premises in as good order as at the beginning, "ordi-
nary wear and tear excepted, and damage by fire or other casualty ex-
cepted." The tenant also promised to make repairs "excepting in case
of destruction or damage by fire or other casualty." The landlord
agreed to keep the premises insured and, if damaged by fire, to repair
and restore them. In a suit for damages based on the tenant's negli-
gence in causing a fire, the tenant defended on the ground that the
lease terms relieved it from liability even where the tenant was negli-
gent. After reviewing the authorities, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina rejected the tenant's contentions and held for the landlord,
saying:
Contracts for exemption from liability for negligence are not
favored by the law, and are strictly construed against the party
asserting it. The contract will never be so interpreted in the ab-
sence of clear and explicit words that such was the intent of the
parties.4
3. 238 N.C. 589, 79 S.E.2d 185 (1953).
4. Id. at 596, 79 S.E.2d at 190. The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently
has reaffirmed Winkler in Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121,
143 S.E.2d 279 (1965).
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Similarly, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Poling,5 the landlord counter-
claimed for destruction of his building by fire caused by the tenant's
negligence in cutting a hole in the fire wall. The tenant defended on
the ground that the lease relieved him from liability. In the lease the
landlord agreed to insure the building against "fire or tornado", and
promised to rebuild the premises if rendered unfit "by fire, tornado,
earthquake, or any casualty" or, if the landlord did not rebuild, the
tenant had the option to use the insurance proceeds or be paid therefor
by the landlord. The lease contained the customary surrender clause,.
i.e., that the premises be in substantially as good condition as received,
"loss by fire, tornado, earthquake or any unavoidable casualty and ordi-
nary wear and tear excepted." The tenant argued that the insurance
clause and surrender clause together spelled out relief from -liability,
but the Supreme Court of Iowa held for the landlord, observing:
From these two clauses [insurance requirement and application of
insurance to expense of rebuilding] it appears the insurance was
to constitute a fund for reconstructing the building, if either party
desired to do so in the event of its destruction by fire.6
This view of strict construction of exculpation provisions which
rejects tenant's contentions based on the phraseology of various lease
provisions also has been followed in California,7 District of Columbia,s
Georgia, 9 Nebraska,1" New York, 1 Pennsylvania, 12 Tennessee, 3 Texas,' 4
Virginia, 5 and Washington. 16
5. 248 Iowa 582, 81 N.W.2d 462 (1957).
6. Id. at 591, 81 N.W.2d at 467.
7. Morris v. Warner, 207 Cal. 498, 279 Pac. 152 (1929).
8. Maiatico v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 287 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
9. Taylor v. ROA Motors, Inc., 114 Ga. App. 671, 152 S.E.2d 631 (1966); Stone
Mountain Industries, Inc. v. Bennett, 112 Ga. App. 466, 145 S.E.2d 591 (1965).
10. Brophy v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 98 Neb. 307, 152 N.W. 557 (1915).
11. Galante v. Hathaway Bakeries, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 142, 176 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1958).
12. Dilks v. Flohr Chevrolet, Inc., 411 Pa. 425, 192 A.2d 682 (1963).
13. Bishop v. Associated Transport, Inc., 46 Tenn. App. 644, 332 S.W.2d 696 (1960);
see Chazen v. Trailmobile, Inc., 215 Tenn. 87, 384 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
14. Wichita City Lines, Inc. v. Puckett, 156 Tex. 456, 295 S.W.2d 894 (1956).
15. National Motels. Inc. v. Howard Johnson Inc. of Washington, 373 F.2d 375 (4th
Cir. 1967), in which exculpation was denied under the terms of a lease which, in addi-
tion to the surrender and fire clauses above discussed, also provided:
TWENTY-THIRD: The LESSEE covenants that it will, at all times
during the term of this lease, protect, indemnify and save harmless the
LESSOR from and against any and all loss, damage, or liability incurred by
any act or neglect of the LESSEE, or any of its agents, servants or em-
[Vol. 9:45Z
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The rationale of the view denying exculpatiori of the tenant gen-
erally falls within the following categories:
(a) Exculpation must be spelled out clearly and unequiv-
ocally.17
(b) It is and would be unnatural for the landlord to release
the tenant for its own negligence in the absence of express
agreement covering this.'
(c) The insurance proceeds constitute merely a fund
guaranteeing the fiscal responsibility of the landlord and have
absolutely nothing to do with the liability of the tenant.'9
(d) Agreements or undertakings dealing with who shall
carry the insurance, whether landlord or tenant, cannot and
should not determine the liability of the tenant for his own
negligence.2°
(e) To read into a lease exculpation provisions which are
not clearly and specifically set forth may well constitute an
"advance release" of subrogation rights thereby causing the
ployees, in, on or about the demised premises; and that it will at all
times, at its own cost, and for the benefit of the LESSOR, protect the
LESSOR with public liability insurance, issued in the name of the LESSEE
and the LESSOR, as their interest may appear; and in such company and
in such form as may be reasonably satisfactory to the LESSOR, in amounts
of not less than Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) in case of damage or
injury to one person, not less than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,-
000) in case of damage or injury to more than one person; and that it will
within thirty (30) days from the date of the beginning of the term of
this lease, deposit with LESSOR a certificate showing such insurance to be
then in force; and that it will keep such insurance in full force and effect
during the term of this lease.
16. Carstens v. Western Pipe & Steel Co., 142 Wash. 259, 252 Pac. 939 (1927).
17. Dilks v. Flohr Chevrolet, Inc., 411 Pa. 425, 434-36, 192 A.2d 682, 687-88 (1963);
Maiatico v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 287 F.2d 349, 351 (D.C. App. 1961); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Poling, 248 Iowa 582, 588-92, 81 N.W.2d 462, 465-66 (1957); Winkler v. Appalachian
Amusement Co., 238 N.C. 589, 596, 79 S.E.2d 185, 190 (1953); Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Esso Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279, 283 (1965); Carstens v. Western
Pipe & Steel Co., 142 Wash. 259, 265, 252 P.A.C. 939, 941 (1927).
18. Vinkler v. Appalachian Amusement Co., 238 N.C. 589, 596, 79 S.E.2d 185, 191
(1953); Carstens v. Western Pipe & Steel Co., 142 Wash. 259, 265, 252 P.A.C. 939, 941
(1927).
19. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc. v. Poling, 248 Iowa 582, 592, 81 N.W.2d 462, 467
(1957); Cerny-Pickas & Company v. C. R. Jahn Company, 7 Ill.2d 393, 402, 131 N.E.2d
100, 105 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
20. Maiatico v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 287 F.2d 349, 352 (D.C. App. 1961); Dilks v. Flohr
Chevrolet, Inc., 411 Pa. 425, 437, 192 A.2d 682, 688 (1963).
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landlord, in those instances where the landlord maintains in-
surance, to lose all insurance protection.2'
(f) A fundamental distinction must be drawn between con-
tract obligations as specified under the lease and tort obliga-
dons which arise by operation of law, these obligations being
separate and distinct.2
2
VIEW FAVORING EXCULPATION
Another line of authorities exculpates the tenant. Typical of these is
Cerny-Pickas & Company v. C. R. Jahn Conpany2 3 Cerny-Pickas &
Company was tenant of an industrial building which was destroyed
by fire caused by its negligence. The lease contained a conventional
surrender clause to the effect that the tenant would yield up the premises
to the landlord in good condition and repair, loss by fire and ordinary
wear excepted. There also was a provision that the landlord would pay
for fire insurance on the building, equipment and machinery. The
landlord's insurance carrier brought suit as subrogee under the land-
lord's insurance policy to recover damages by reason of the tenant's
negligence. The Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that all the lease
provisions had to be considered together, reasoning:
Under the construction urged by the lessor it would be necessary
for both parties to the lease to carry fire insurance if they are to
be protected. The lessee would have to insure against fires due to
his negligence, and the lessor against fires due to other causes.
Whether the kind of policy the lessee would have needed was
commercially available when the present lease was entered into is
at best dubious .... In the present lease the lessor agrees in clause
14 to pay for fire insurance upon the leased building, equipment
and machinery. The parties contemplated that the risk by loss by
fire should be insured against and we see no reason to suppose
that they did not contemplate the customary insurance policy
which covers both accidental and negligent fires .... From the
lease as a whole we conclude that the lessee was not to be liable
for loss by fire regardless of the cause of the fire, and that the
21. Maiatico v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 287 F.2d 349, 352 (D.C. App. 1961); see United
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Phil-Mar Corp., 166 Ohio St. 85, 93, 139 NZE.2d 330, 335-36 (1956)
(dissenting opinion).
22. Galante v. Hathaway Bakeries, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 142, 146, 176 N.Y.S.2d 87, 91
(1958); see General Mills, Inc. v. Goldman, 184 F.2d 359, 370 (8th Cit. 1950) (dissenting
opinion).
23. 7 I11.2d 393, 131 N.E.2d 100 (1955).
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parties intended that the lessor should look solely to insurance
as compensation for damage caused by any kind of fire.24
More recently, this exculpation approach was adopted in Rock
Springs Realty, Inc. v. Waid.25 The Missouri Supreme Court observed
that the lease assumed that landlord would maintain insurance on the
building and forbade tenants from doing anything which would cause
cancellation of insurance or premium increase. This convinced the
Court that the intent of the parties was to exculpate the tenant. The
Court reasoned that the exemption of "loss by fire" in the surrender
clause included all fires except those classed as arson.
In addition to Illinois and Missouri, the tenant's exculpation has been
approved in Arizona, 2 Mississippi 7 and Ohio.28 Based on the interpre-
tation placed on comparable provisions in building construction con-
tracts, Minnesota29 and Oregon 0 probably will be added to this list.
A similar result was reached in General Mills, Inc. v. Goldman3l even
where there was no specific undertaking in the lease by the landlord
to carry fire insurance. There was an "understanding" that the land-
lord would carry insurance and, in fact, the landlord did carry it. Con-
sidering these circumstances the Court construed the surrender clause
with the language "loss by fire and ordinary wear excepted," thusly:
It is very clear in the light of all the provisions of the lease, the
circumstances of its execution and the understanding about fire
insurance coverage to which the lease was related that by the pro-
vision that on termination of the lease the tenant should return
the property in good condition "loss by fire . . . excepted" the
parties meant a loss by fire such as is always meant when men
are talking about or figuring on the risk of it in business dealings
-i.e., the "loss by fire" which always is insured against in ordi-
24. Id. at 396-98, 131 N.E.2d at 103.
25. 392 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. 1965). This ruling, as a practical matter, reverses Poslosky
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 349 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. 1961).
26. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Traders Furniture Co.,
I Ariz. 203, 401 P.2d 157 (1965).
27. Fry v. Jordan Auto Company, 80 So.2d 53 (Miss. 1955).
28. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Phil-Mar Corp., 166 Ohio St. 85, 139 N.E.2d 330
(1956).
29. Independent School District No. 877 v. Loberg Plumbing & Heating Co., 226
Minn. 426, 123 N.W.2d 793 (1963).
30. Waterway Terminals Co. v. P. S. Lord Mechanical Contractors, 241 Ore. 1, 406
P.2d 556 (1965).
31. 184 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1950).
1967]
WILLIAM"AND MARY LAW REVIEW
nary course and against which the landlords here ifntended to and
did take out insurance .in an amount greater than the owners' in-
vestment.8
2
SUMMARY
Some recent decisions have attempted to rationalize both views into
one result,33 emphasizing that while lease provisions may be similar
each case must stand on its own facts. As a general proposition un-
doubtedly each case must stand on its own facts, but this notwith-
standing, a substantial coriflict does exist among the authorities and each
court which faces this problem m the future will be obliged to consider
these opposing views and make a choice.
Although the arguments in support of the tenant's exculpation are
quite persuasive, it must be remembered that at the outset the courts
are faced with the well-settled principle that exculpatory provisions
are not favored by the law and will be construed stricly against the
party relying upon them. Stated otherwise, contracts for exemption
from liability on account of one's own negligence must be clear and
explicit. 34 Therefore, the rule requiring strict construction of exculpa-
tory provisions should result in a demal of exculpation based on the
typical lease surrender clause alone or in company with an undertaking
by the landlord to carry fire and casualty insurance. If the parties in-
tend that the tenant is to be exculpated, the lease should so provide in
unmistakable terms. The necessity of resorting to various separate lease
provisions to determine the parties' intention would seem to negate the
essential ingredients of clarity and explicitness.
32. Id. at 366.
33. See, e.g., Waterway Terminals Co. v. P S. Lord Mechanical Contractors Co., 241
Ore. 1, 406 P.2d 556 (1965); Chazen v. Trailmobile, Inc., 215 Tenn. 87, 384 S.W.2d 1
(1964).
34. 27 AM. JuR., Indemnity § 15 (1940); 42 CJ.S. Indemmty § 12 (1942); Annot, 175
A.L.R. 8, 18 (1948) As Judge Armistead Dobie observed, in Fairfax Gas & Supply Co.
v. Hadary, 151 F.2d 939, 940 (4th Cir. 1945)-
The cases vary widely as to the power of a purely private contractor to
stipulate by contract against liability for negligence. All of the cases seem to
agree that such stipulations are not favored and are always to be strictly
construed.
[Vol. 19-452458
